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Abstract
Understanding cooperation in animal social groups remains a significant challenge for evolutionary theory. Observed
behaviours that benefit others but incur some cost appear incompatible with classical notions of natural selection; however,
these behaviours may be explained by concepts such as inclusive fitness, reciprocity, intra-specific mutualism or
manipulation. In this work, we examine a seemingly altruistic behaviour, the active recruitment of conspecifics to a food
resource through signalling. Here collective, cooperative behaviour may provide highly nonlinear benefits to individuals,
since group functionality has the potential to be far greater than the sum of the component parts, for example by enabling
the effective tracking of a dynamic resource. We show that due to this effect, signalling to others is an evolutionarily stable
strategy under certain environmental conditions, even when there is a cost associated to this behaviour. While exploitation
is possible, in the limiting case of a sparse, ephemeral but locally abundant nutrient source, a given environmental profile
will support a fixed number of signalling individuals. Through a quantitative analysis, this effective carrying capacity for
cooperation is related to the characteristic length and time scales of the resource field.
Citation: Torney CJ, Berdahl A, Couzin ID (2011) Signalling and the Evolution of Cooperative Foraging in Dynamic Environments. PLoS Comput Biol 7(9):
e1002194. doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002194
Editor: Lauren Ancel Meyers, University of Texas at Austin, United States of America
Received March 4, 2011; Accepted July 29, 2011; Published September 22, 2011
Copyright:  2011 Torney et al. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits
unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.
Funding: This research was supported by the following funders: ONR (N00014-09-1-1074), DARPA (HR0011-05-1-0057), NSF (PHY-0848755), Searle Scholars
Award (08-SPP-201), and NSERC. The funders had no role in study design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript.
Competing Interests: The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.
* E-mail: ctorney@princeton.edu
Introduction
In many systems subject to evolutionary pressure, there exists a
discrepancy between behaviour that is adaptive at the individual
level and that which would be most beneficial for higher levels of
social or biological organization. When individual self-interest runs
counter to the best interests of the collective, it can lead to what is
known as the tragedy of the commons [1]. While a cooperative,
enlightened approach results in higher average net benefits to all,
an individual that contributes nothing but benefits from the
behaviour of others will hold an advantage. This fitness differential
allows the invasion of non-cooperators, to the detriment of the
collective [2].
Despite this issue, examples of altruism and cooperation abound
in the natural world [3]. Indeed cooperative behaviour and the
suppression of competition for the benefit of higher level entities
are hallmarks of the major transitions in evolution [4]. Several
explanations have been proposed for this apparent paradox [5],
the most pervasive and all-encompassing being Hamilton’s notion
of inclusive fitness [6]. However, open questions remain, notably
concerning the relative importance of different drivers of
cooperation amongst non-kin [7], the effects of synergistic
interactions on the evolutionary dynamic [8,9], and how to
engender optimal, cooperative solutions in artificial or social
systems [10,11].
Locating and exploiting resources is an ever present challenge
for all organisms, and it is an area where cooperative strategies can
greatly improve the probability of success. Social foraging theory
has shown animals in groups are able to acquire more information
about their environments than if they were to forage alone
[12–15]. Search efficiency and the processing of environmental
cues may consequently be improved [16–19], while sharing the
located resources with conspecifics dissipates the risk associated
with unsuccessful foraging attempts when conditions are unpre-
dictable [20].
Effective and honest communication in these situations would
clearly improve foraging efficiency since it provides individuals
with an additional level of reliable information [21]. However,
while it is clear to see how individuals would evolve to take
advantage of the inadvertent social information provided by others
[22], understanding the evolution of honest communication
represents a further challenge [23,24].
The study of information in an ecological context is an active
and important area of research, encompassing learning, commu-
nication, exploitation through informational parasitism, and
strategic social interaction [25,26]. The seminal idea for this field
is the information centre hypothesis (ICH) proposed by Ward and
Zahavi [27]. They suggested that communal roosts, breeding
colonies and other bird assemblages have evolved primarily for the
purpose of sharing information. While this work has inspired many
further investigations, it has generated some criticism [28], notably
due to its reliance on a group selectionist argument to explain
costly flight displays [29].
As an alternative to the ICH, Richner and Heeb proposed the
recruitment centre hypothesis (RCH) [30], which argued that
since foraging in groups often provides some benefit (e.g. increased
predator vigilance, access to defended resources), aggregations of
conspecifics provide successful foragers with a recruitment centre
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However this hypothesis also relies on an implicit group selection
argument [31,32], since it does not explain how the collective
resists degradation due to informational parasitism.
Several studies based on evolutionary game theory and
numerical simulations [32–35] have shown both hypotheses are
potentially correct, depending on the ecological circumstances,
such as the benefits of group foraging [33,36], the finder’s share,
i.e. the advantage of locating the resource first [32] and the
temporal dynamics of the resource. These studies also emphasize
the distinction between inadvertent social information and the
active recruitment of conspecifics, and they suggest the ICH is an
appropriate explanation for the evolution of social aggregation
when information is shared inadvertently [37], whereas when
costly, active communication is involved, there must be an
offsetting advantage, as is the case for the RCH.
Active recruitment of conspecifics to resources is observed in
several species, and when not attributed to indirect fitness benefits
(see e.g. [38]), is often associated with a manipulation of the
environment. For example, by increasing the local density of
foragers an individual may in fact reduce its own risk of predation
[39,40], or be able to gain access to defended resources [41,42]. In
some ephemeral environments it has been noted that food calling
may be beneficial since it enables the tracking of a resource. This
behaviour has been observed in cliff swallows [43,44] where it
occurs when the food source (in this case an insect swarm) is
advected by moderate winds. In this situation acting cooperatively
could result in a higher level functionality as signalling enables a
collective-level response to the environment through the effective
tracking of the insect cloud. However, non-signallers are able to
exploit other signallers without incurring the associated costs
arising, for example, through the energetic costs of producing the
signal.
The purpose of this work is to investigate the conditions where
signalling can be maintained due to the nature of the resource
environment. Through a numerical study of evolution in a two
dimensional turbulent environment we show that, within a certain
region of parameter space, a cooperative signalling strategy is
stable. A reduced model that retains the essential features of the
full simulation is then analyzed and the mechanisms that drive the
evolutionary dynamic are explored.
Model
The underlying biological and physical processes that shape
environmental conditions often result in patchy and heterogenous
landscapes [45,46], where resource distribution is highly variable.
Additionally, stochastic advective forces by their nature, lead to a
stretching and folding of the resource, resulting in localized high
concentration regions with filamental structures [47].
The summary effect of these processes is the presence of steep
local gradients in nutrient concentration. Fluctuations and
stochasticity in an organism’s position relative to the resource,
are therefore capable of significantly affecting both nutrient uptake
and perception of the resource. Perturbations, either due to the
nature of the advective carrier flow, or to the random motion of
the organism, may result in sharp decreases in the experienced
resource concentration and the loss of an unexploited food patch.
In this situation social interactions can be greatly beneficial as the
effective sampling size of the organism is increased, and when a
resource is lost it may be relocated by following others [13,14,16].
Conspecifics in this case may be considered as a source of
information [25,48,49] and the behaviour of other individuals can
be modified to either enhance or impair this information [50,51].
In our model individuals forage within a chaotic environment
and freely evolve the ability to do so cooperatively, by signalling to
others when they have located a region of high nutrient
availability. It is assumed this is an active behaviour as opposed
to inadvertent social information (ISI) [22], and also that it elicits
an appropriate response from near neighbours that are seeking the
resource. In this scenario ISI as described in [22], may be a
precursor to the active recruitment of others, since as shown
below, a conspicuous response to locating a resource may well be
adaptive.
Foraging environment
To generate a realistic stochastic environment a synthetic
turbulence model was used [52]. This approach randomly evolves
the phase and amplitude of the Fourier modes of the carrier flow,
and through a wavelength dependent noise intensity is able to
create an isotropic turbulent flow with a prescribed energy
spectrum. Here we use the Ka ´rman-Obukhov spectrum [53],
however the results presented are independent of the statistical
properties of the carrier flow as demonstrated in section.
The flow field is used to advect a concentration field r
(representing a nutrient source), that is advected, added into the
system at a constant rate and subject to exponential decay. Hence
Lr
Lt
zvf:+r~S(r0){br ð1Þ
where vf is the flow velocity, and b is the decay rate. S(r0) is an
advected nutrient source defined as
S(r0)~rr exp½
jx{r0j
2
2v2 j, ð2Þ
so it is added at a rate defined by rr, over a width defined by v
and its centre is advected according to _ r r0~vf. By introducing the
nondimensional variables r
0
~br=rr and t
0
~bt, Eqn. 1 becomes
(after dropping primes),
Author Summary
One of the key challenges facing evolutionary theory is
understanding how cooperation and communication
evolve in social systems. In many situations cooperation
leads to higher net benefits to all, but a population of
cooperators is vulnerable to invasion from exploitative
strategies. When foraging, aiding others through sharing
information can lead to an advantage to a collective of
communicating individuals. How this behaviour can be
maintained and resist invasion without centralized control
or policing is currently not clear. In this work, we examine a
social foraging system where individuals evolve to signal
to conspecifics when they locate a resource. We show that
in some environments, cooperative signalling is sustained
through a form of indirect reciprocation, as a signalling
phenotype is more likely to be the beneficiary of a signal
from a conspecific in the future. This effect naturally occurs
as a result of the foraging dynamic and, depending on the
environment, such as how resources are distributed and
how difficult they are to track, will compensate for
relatively large costs of signalling. Through simulations
and a simplified model we examine the parameters driving
this process and identify the mechanisms required for
cooperation to evolve in such a system.
Cooperative Signalling in Dynamic Environments
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Lt
zvf:+r~exp½
jx{r0j
2
2v2 j{r: ð3Þ
We fix the length scale of the largest energy mode to be equal to
the system size L and rescale so that the environment is simulated
on the unit torus. This leaves two parameters which determine the
characteristics of the resource field, the average flow velocity,
SjvfjT and the width of the exponential source term v. In Figure 1
snapshots of the environment for various parameter values are
shown.
Behavioural rules
Individuals foraging in the generated environment follow simple
behavioural rules corresponding to two distinct and discrete
strategies. The two categories of individual are signallers (S), a
strategy that may be equated to the cooperate strategy of
traditional game theoretic models, and non-signallers (NS), which
equivalently are considered analogousto defectors. When signallers
locate a favourable nutrient region, they actively recruit others
through some form of communication. If an individual is within
range of a signal and is not currently located in a preferred region,
this individual becomes attracted to the source of the signal.
At the individual level no search strategy exists and no form of
taxis occurs. Instead a solitary individual performs a correlated
random walk through the environment at constant speed, so that
their average nutrient uptake is equal to the mean concentration.
While there are many asocial strategies that result in a nutrient
exposure greater than this mean value (see e.g. [54–56]), we select
this as the baseline asocial performance. Since we are interested in
the relative improvement provided by cooperation, the baseline
asocial uptake rate is arbitrary and incorporating a more
intelligent asocial response would be equivalent to a rescaling of
the cost function. As supplementary material (Text S1 and Figure
S1) we include an investigation of the effect of an asocial search
strategy, and show that the qualitative features of the results
described below are unaffected.
Figure 1. Snapshots of resource field for different parameter values. (A) Size of source, v~0:025, mean absolute velocity SjvfjT~1:125, (B)
v~0:075, SjvfjT~1:125, (C) v~0:05, SjvfjT~0:5, (D) v~0:025, SjvfjT~3:125. Colour bars show resource concentrations.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002194.g001
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themselves at a constant speed along their axis of orientation,
_ r ri~vf(ri,t)zvpi ð4Þ
where ri is the spatial position of individual i, pi is its orientation,
and v is the constant self-propulsion speed. Two further variables
define an individual’s state, a normalized current concentration
value,
ri(t)~
r(ri,t)
rMAX
ð5Þ
and a state of signalling or not Si[f0,1g, where Si~1 indicates
individual i is giving a signal that it is located in a high nutrient
region, which is then perceived by all neighbours within a certain
interaction range.
The signal and response dynamic is stochastic with the
probability of performing a certain behaviour determined by both
phenotype and external conditions. At each time step, the
probability of emitting a signal is
PS(Si~1)~
0 ri(t)ƒ0:5
ri(t) ri(t)w0:5
(
PNS(Si~1)~0
ð6Þ
for the respective cases of a signaller and a non-signaller. The
probability of responding to a signal is the same for both
phenotypes and depends only on the experienced nutrient
concentration (i.e. an individual experiencing a high resource
concentration will more readily ignore a signal),
P(Rij~1)~
1 ri(t)ƒ0:5
1{ri(t) ri(t)w0:5
 
ð7Þ
where Rij[f0,1g defines whether individual i will respond to a
signal from j. Based on this interaction a preferred direction of
travel, di is defined,
di~
X
Sj,Rij~1
rj{ri
jrj{rij
ð8Þ
so that an individual turns toward the average location of the
individuals that are signalling and that it has decided to respond
to.
It is worth noting at this point, individuals only interact when a
signal has been given. In the absence of signalling all foragers are
effectively invisible. While responding to non-signalling conspecif-
ics may be beneficial [25], active recruitment will provide an
additional benefit for the collective, hence by assuming only
signalling individuals are attracting, we focus solely on this
increased benefit. Since in our model the nutrient resource is
not consumed and individuals are represented by point particles,
this effective invisibility extends to preclude issues of crowding and
consumption. These effects are then avoided, and the cost
experienced by signallers is incorporated into a single parameter
that discounts their uptake rate.
The signalling cost may arise as a result of various factors, the
most obvious being the energy expended in producing the signal.
While this may seem slight, the energy budget for free-living birds
is often finely balanced [57]. Signalling also has the potential to
attract the attention of predators, however this may be countered
by an increased dilution and/or confusion effect [58,59], and the
relative significance of these effects is highly context dependent. It
is assumed that competition through consumption is not an issue,
i.e. the product of meal size with number of foragers is less than
the total resource available, and individuals may modulate their
signal range in order to ensure this is the case. Despite this, since
access to the resource is time limited, there may well be a cost from
interference effects or crowding.
Regardless of the nature or source of the immediate cost of
signalling, in a well mixed, highly mobile population, any
behaviour that benefits others is essentially costly since it will
increase local competition for mates, territory or preferred
breeding sites. The act of signalling must therefore be understood
in the context of the direct advantage it conveys to the actor.
Results
Evolutionary simulations in a complex environment
The within generation process is defined by the environment
and the behavioural rules outlined above. The foraging success of
each individual is dependent on their phenotype, the behaviour of
others and the statistical properties of the resource field.
Simulations of the foraging process were performed, then a
roulette wheel algorithm was used to select individuals to
contribute to the next generation according to their fitness. Here
fitness is defined as normalized foraging success less the cost paid
through signalling. Cost is levied at a constant rate, not on a per
signal basis, although both are statistically equivalent.
The steady state absolute number of signalling individuals for a
range of parameter values are shown in Figure 2, for two different
cost values. (The cost is defined as a percentage of the mean
resource value to ensure consistency across varying patch sizes.)
For these simulations an initial seeding of 8 signalling individuals
was used in a total population of 512. Although reasonably
arbitrary, this initial number is required as a small critical
threshold of signallers must be present for the strategy to be viable
(as illustrated in Figure 3).
These plots demonstrate the existence of a fixed density of
signallers that is robust to invasion by the non-signalling
phenotype and that is dependent upon the statistical properties
of the resource field. The region of parameter space which
supports the cooperative phenotype is characterized by interme-
diate patch size and flow velocity. In this regime the resource field
is not widely distributed or well mixed, and there exists a high
variance in concentration. When the patch source size, v is very
small, uptake is low for all strategies and the additional cost drives
signallers to extinction.
In Figures 3(a) and 3(b) we plot the relative uptake of signallers
(uS) over non-signallers (uNS) for different signaller densities. Since
we are encapsulating the costs of signalling within a single
parameter, effects such as the increased competition for the
resource are not explicitly included, thus the presence of the non-
signalling phenotype has no effect on others and their density is
not relevant. Since the number of non-signallers is therefore
arbitrary, it is the absolute number of signallers in the population
that is the quantity of interest, rather than their percentage. It
should be noted that while the relative frequency of cooperators
and non-cooperators will affect the speed of evolution, the
direction of selection and the location of points of evolutionary
stability are determined only by the absolute number. The
increase in uptake experienced by a group of signallers as their
number increases is shown in Figure 3(c).
Cooperative Signalling in Dynamic Environments
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number of signallers is reached, the strategy outperforms non-
signallers. Under selection pressure this advantage leads to an
increase in the number of individuals adopting the signalling
strategy until a certain equilibrium density is attained. At this point
both discrete strategies have on average equal fitness and an
evolutionarily stable polymorphic population exists. The value of
this stable density is a function of the cost attributed to emitting a
signal, and the temporal and spatial correlation lengths of the
resource. From Figure 3(d) it can be seen that relatively large
increases in cost have only marginal impact on the evolutionarily
stable density, due to the steep gradients in differential uptake that
occur as this density changes.
The reason for this outcome lies in the manipulative effects of
the signalling individuals. Effectively a signaller increases the local
density of conspecifics in its immediate vicinity, meaning it is more
likely to subsequently benefit from the behaviour of other
signallers in the population. To understand how the properties
of the resource field influence this dynamic, we now introduce a
simple model representation that is amenable to an analytical
treatment and a fuller exposition of the underlying mechanisms.
Numerical and analytical study of a reduced model
For analytical tractability we now consider a reduced, but
qualitatively equivalent model, in which individuals follow
analogous behavioural rules, but instead forage in an environment
with a simple resource distribution and no advective forces. In this
environment (see Video S1 for an animation of the model), the
resource is represented by a single circular patch of radius R that
encloses a region of uniform concentration. This patch persists for
time T, before periodically moving to a new, randomly selected
location.
Individuals move at constant speed and are unable to stop when
locating a resource patch. This constraint is enforced so that the
model is consistent with the full simulations described above.
When chaotic, advective forces are present an individual cannot
simply maintain its position in a region of high resource
concentration; instead maintaining this position is an active
process that requires constant processing of environmental and
social cues or signals. Since in our reduced model there is no
advection, we capture this effect by imposing the constant velocity
condition, effectively ensuring there is a non-zero relative velocity
as is the case when the resource and/or individuals are subject to
stochastic advective forces.
In combination, the constant individual velocity and intermit-
tent relocation of the resource patch capture the dynamics of the
full model. The spatial variance of the resource determines the
range over which uptake rates can vary, i.e. more localized, high
concentration regions lead to a greater difference between an
effective search strategy and random motion. However, the role of
the temporal dynamics is more complex. The aim of this section is
to understand this role by isolating the essential features of the full
model. We do this by coarse-graining the spectrum of the
turbulent velocity fluctuations into two processes that operate at
different time scales. The first is characterized by the frequent
occasions on which the resource is lost by the collective. This is
equivalent to the resource relocation in the reduced model, and to
large scale fluctuations in the full model. The second process
operates over the short term and involves the loss of the resource
by individuals, imposed by forcing individuals to move through the
patch in the reduced case, and by the constant, small scale
fluctuations in the full simulations.
Our model therefore has only two relevant parameters, the
spatial correlation length of the resource, R and its temporal
correlation, T. Numerical simulations were performed for various
combinations of R and T and the relative uptake of signallers
compared to non-signallers is plotted in Figure 4. The results
qualitatively match the full simulations and show that the
requirements for the evolution of signalling are that the resource
is localized, requires cooperation in order to be tracked effectively,
and is intermittently lost.
To more quantitatively understand this process four steps are
required, each involving a certain degree of approximation, but
which in combination provide a heuristic and intuitive explanation
of the underlying mechanisms which link the statistical properties
of the environment to the evolutionary dynamic. In summary
these steps are
1. Firstly time is discretized and it is assumed the future state of
the system depends only its state in the current time interval
and not on previous history.
2. Secondly, transition probabilities are determined for an
individual to enter or exit the resource patch depending on
whether a signal has been given or not.
3. Next the dynamic is divided into two distinct temporal regimes.
The first occurring immediately after the resource has been lost
and continuing until a stable cohort of signallers have located
it. The second regime begins when this stable cohort emerges
and continues until the resource again relocates.
Figure 2. Evolutionary equilibrium number of signallers. Results
are for a range of mean velocities, SjvfjT and source widths v. Cost
values are for, (A) c~10% and (B) c~5%.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002194.g002
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calculated during the transient first regime. During the second
regime both strategies perform equally, hence the overall
advantage to signallers is calculated by weighting the transient
advantage according to the relative lengths of the two regimes.
Temporal discretization. In the analysis that follows we
assume events occur at discrete time intervals. Within a given
interval an individual forager may make the transition from a state
of being external to the food patch to being within the resource,
and vice versa. The most natural choice for the length of this time
step is the time required for an individual to cross the resource
patch at its widest point, Dt~
2R
v
where v is the speed of an
individual. The probability an individual enters the patch within
this interval can then be calculated for both the case when no
signaller is present, that is the individual enters by chance, and
when a signal has been received.
Further to this, it is assumed the probability of the system
transitioning to a given state at the next discrete time interval is
dependent only on the current state, and not on any previous
history, i.e. the process exhibits the Markov property [60].
Transition probabilities. We define a as the probability an
individual enters the resource patch in the absence of any signal
and b as the probability of entering given a signaller is present
within the patch and indicating its location. By definition bwa.
Since the time interval, Dt is defined as the minimum time taken
to travel a distance of 2R, an individual may only enter the food
patch at the next time step if it is within this distance of the
circumference of the patch. If a signal is given, any individual in
the outer ring of width 2R that surrounds the patch, will move
directly towards the source of the signal and enter the patch at the
next time step.
Therefore, the probability to enter the patch given that a
signaller is present, b, is equal to the probability of being in the
outer ring. Since our environment is of unit area this probability is
equal to the area of the annulus defined by the two concentric
circles,
b~p(3R)
2{pR2~8pR2: ð9Þ
However, if no signaller is present in the patch, an individual
within the outer ring may still enter the patch within the next time
step due to its random motion. This probability, p, is a function of
the distance to the edge of the resource, r, which ranges from 0 to
Figure 3. Resource uptake rates for the turbulent simulations. (A–B) Relative uptake, (uS{uNS)=uS, between signallers and non-signallers as
a function of signaller number for various values of source width v and (A) SjvfjT~0:7, (B) SjvfjT~1:0. (C) Average uptake, SuT, normalized by mean
resource concentration, SrT, for various values of SjvfjT and v. (For the asocial strategy SuT=SrT is unity). (D) The nontrivial (N=0) evolutionarily
stable number of signallers as a function of the cost of signalling for various values of SjvfjT and v (cost is shown as a percentage of the mean
resource concentration SrT). Legend for all figures as (D).
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002194.g003
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the patch, will enter and pass through with probability
1
2
, i.e. it will
either more into or away from the patch. While in the limiting case
of being at the edge of the outer ring (r?2R) this probability goes
to 0. Further, we assume that p varies linearly between these two
limits as a function of the distance to the resource, leading to
p(r)~
1
2
{
r
4R
: ð10Þ
To find a, the probability to enter the patch given no signaller is
present, we calculate p(r) multiplied by the probability to be at r,
and find the average of this value by integrating over the area of
the outer ring. This leads to
a~
ð2p
0
ð2R
0
p(r)(Rzr)drdh~
5
3
pR2 ð11Þ
Division into two regimes. We note two distinct regimes in
the dynamics of the system. When the patch first appears in a new
location it typically has a high probability to be unoccupied or only
intermittently located before being lost again. Eventually a small
cohort of signallers will form upon the patch, where they are able
to leverage their mutual interactions to stay on the patch and
remain there until it moves. In this second phase signallers and
non-signallers alike arrive at the same rate, have little chance of
losing the patch and enjoy equal resource uptake.
However, the nutrient uptake during the first regime is greater
for signallers as compared to non-signallers. For this reason we
calculate the relative length of these regimes. To do so, we
consider a three state system, S[½0,1,2 , shown in Figure 5.
Figure 4. Relative uptake between signallers and non-signallers as a function of signaller number. Each figure shows a unique patch
persistence time, (A) T~1, (B) T~2, (C) T~4, (D) T~8. Blue lines are for patch size R~0:05, red for R~0:1. Solid lines show numerical results,
dashed lines show the equivalent analytic solution.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002194.g004
Figure 5. The three state approximation shown with transition
probabilities. State U (unoccupied) in the diagram corresponds to
state S~0 in the equations. Similarly state O=U (occupied, unstable) is
S~1 and O=S (occupied, stable) is the absorbing state, S~2.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1002194.g005
Cooperative Signalling in Dynamic Environments
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corresponds to the patch being unoccupied (U) by any signaller,
while in the next state, S~1, the patch is occupied but unstable
(O=U), that is a single signaller is present but it will move away
from the patch unless another signaller enters.
The final, absorbing state, S~2, corresponds to the second
regime, when two or more signallers are continually in the patch
(O=S). The transition probabilities from state S~i to state S~j,
pij, are calculated and shown in Figure 5. Note a and b are,
respectively, the probability to enter the patch by chance, or to
enter when a signaller is present as calculated in the previous
section.
State S~2 is an absorbing state, and the mean first passage
time to arrive in that state, t2, will give us the characteristic time
the system typically spends in the first regime,
t2~P0t02zP1t12zP2t22 ð12Þ
where Pi is the probability to be in state S~i when the patch first
appears in a new random location and tij is the mean first passage
time from state i to state j.
We calculate Pi by assuming a random distribution of
individuals on the reappearance of the nutrient patch, while the
mean first passage times are easily found from the transition
probabilities shown in Figure 4 and a recursive formulae obtained
from the theory of Markov processes [60].
First regime occupation probabilities. Now that we have
solved for the length of the transient phase we turn to the relative
uptake between signaller and non-signallers during this regime.
We reduce this regime to a two state system with the patch initially
unoccupied, and focus on two representative individuals
employing each strategy.
It is assumed that once inside the patch a single individual will
leave at the next time step unless another signaller enters.
Therefore a signaller will leave if not able to attract at least one
of the other N{1 signallers, ie. with probability, (1{b)
N{1. One
or more signallers will be attracted to the patch with probability
1{(1{b)
N{1, in which case the focal signaller will remain there.
The transition matrix for the focal signaller entering and leaving
the patch is,
PS~
1{aa
(1{b)
N{1 1{(1{b)
N{1
  
ð13Þ
where element (0,0) is the probability that given the individual is
away from the patch it will remain in this state, element (0,1) is the
probability of locating the nutrient patch at the next time step,
(1,0) the probability to lose the patch given it has been located,
etc.
We can construct analogous matrices for the non-signaller, but
the probabilities are dependent on whether or not a signaller is
already within the patch,
PNS~
1{aa
(1{a)
N 1{(1{a)
N
  
, no signal
1{bb
(1{b)
N{1 1{(1{b)
N{1
  
, signal
8
> > > <
> > > :
ð14Þ
From Eqns. 13 and 14, the distinction between the strategies can
be seen. Both require a signal from another to remain within the
patch, but by not giving the recruitment call the non-signaller is
relying upon a signaller entering by chance, hence the difference
between a and b is the key driver of the relative advantage of the
signalling strategy.
Using these transition matrices we solve for the equilibrium
patch occupation probabilities, pS and pNS, for signallers and non-
signallers respectively, which gives for signallers,
pS~
a
az(1{b)
N{1 ð15Þ
and, for non-signallers,
pNS~ 1{pS ðÞ
a
az(1{a)
N zpS
b
bz(1{b)
N{1 ð16Þ
The occupation probability for the patch is proportional to the
mean uptake of resources for the individuals during the transient
phase. We now weight the occupation probabilities by the relative
time spent in the transient regime, t2=T, to arrive at the overall
uptake differential between the two strategies,
uS{uNS
uS
~
t2
T
pS{pNS
pS
  
ð17Þ
Figure 4 shows Eqn. 17 plotted as a function of N, alongside the
numeric results of the reduced model. Our analytic approximation
matches the data for a range of temporal and spatial correlation
lengths, captures the qualitative trend of the full model, and
illustrates the role of the environmental parameters on the
evolutionary simulations.
Discussion
Many organisms share information, either inadvertently or
through some form of active communication. When communica-
tion is honest and appears to benefit the recipient of the
information but not the donor, it is often considered a form of
cooperative behaviour. The purpose of this work is to further our
understanding of the mechanisms that lead to the evolution and
stable existence of such behaviour.
One example of recruitment signals occurring in nature is the
food calling observed in species of the cliff dwelling swallow, Hirundo
pyrrhonota, when feeding on advected clouds of insects. Recruitment
calls are given only in certain environmental conditions when the
wind speed isatanintermediate levelandithasbeen postulated that
calls are given to improve the foraging success of the recruiter by
enhancing its ability to track the resource [43,44].
We have shown that signalling that a food source has been
located is indeed an adaptive strategy. We go beyond speculation
and provide a mechanistic explanation for the evolution of this
behaviour. Signallers raise the local density of fellow signallers
around them, this enables a collective response to the resource and
hence strongly influences foraging performance. When conditions
are appropriate, this effect is sufficient to offset relatively large
costs imposed on signalling.
The simulations of the full turbulence model we present
demonstrate the existence of a region of parameter space in
which the cooperative, signalling strategy is stable. At first glance
the key mechanisms that create this outcome are unclear, but by
introducing a reduced model we relate the properties of the
environment to the stable density of signallers. This reduced model
effectively displays two separate time scales. By enforcing each
Cooperative Signalling in Dynamic Environments
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resource is lost is created, thereby giving an advantage to
cooperation. This time scale is defined by the average time taken
to traverse the resource, if a signal from a conspecific isn’t received
within this time frame, the resource will be lost.
The second time scale is defined by the time between relocation
events, when the resource is entirely lost. In the full simulations, this is
equivalent to the infrequent events when large velocity fluctuations
cause all individuals to lose track of the resource. The reduced model
effectively has a bimodal distribution of stochasticity, while in real
dynamical systems a continuous spectrum exists, but this difference is
not important. What matters is that on a shorter timescale, cooperation
is beneficial (how beneficial depends on the local variance of the
resource i.e. its spatial correlation), whereas infrequent, but more severe
fluctuations, put an effective time limit on the period signallers may be
exploited, weighting the benefit towards those that contribute to the
collective effort early, and thus restricting the evolution of a defector
strategy.
These mechanisms can be related to the processes involved in
other studies of information use in ecology, notably those
concerning the information or recruitment centre hypotheses for
colonial living birds [27,30]. While these studies consider a form of
central place foraging the requirements for active communication
to evolve are analogous. In all of these studies, as in our model,
there is a cost associated with recruitment, for example through
the energetic costs of returning to the nest or of performing pre-
departure displays. For information transfer to evolve as an active,
adaptive behaviour there has to be a group level benefit, while to
be robust to invasion from non-cooperating strategies there must
be a finder’s advantage for the communicating strategy [32].
To facilitate comparison to such works (e.g. [25,32]) we note
some key similarities and differences to our model. Common
properties are the presence of a cost associated to recruitment, an
advantage to foraging in a group, the presence of a sparse,
abundant and ephemeral resource distribution, and that the
relative advantage to discovering the resource first is dependent on
the timescale over which the resource lasts.
Important distinctions are that the finder’s share is conditional on
recruitment, hence recruitment does not only reduce the information
producer population as in [32] but instead enables the transient
increased uptake. Secondly, the group advantage is not acquired when
other individuals regardless of phenotype are present, such as is the case
when it is provided by access to defended resources [33,36] or via local
enhancement [61], but is instead dependent on the presence of
individuals with the cooperative phenotype.
Our results suggest signalling strategies may have evolved in a wide
range of scenarios. Diffuse resource fields scattered by advective flows,
as in our full turbulence model, are ubiquitous throughout aquatic and
aerial environments. Scavengers and decomposers may face a similar
challenge when locating and staying with resources that may be lost
due to movement by flows or larger organisms, or through
displacement by dominant competitors if insufficient conspecifics are
present. Further, organisms constrained to provide information to
conspecifics through cues, such as strongly electric fish which use
electric fields to capture their food, or other organisms inadvertently
displaying stereotyped feeding behaviour (including, for example,
hunger or dominance displays [42]), may be predisposed to signalling
and therefore an evolutionary stepping stone to active recruitment and
communicating, cooperative social groups.
Supporting Information
Figure S1 Relative uptake between signallers and non-
signallers as a function of signaller number for various
values of the asocial search parameter. Source width,
v~0:04, SjvfjT~1. Inset: Increase in uptake for lone individuals
as a function of search parameter, vg. Uptake value is normalized
by the mean resource concentration.
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Text S1 Individual search behaviour. Further analysis of
the effects of including an individual search strategy in the
evolutionary model.
(PDF)
Video S1 Animation of the foraging dynamics for 48
signallers and 48 non-signallers. Reduced model parameters
R~0:05, T~2. Uptake is approximately equal between the two
strategies; signaller density is high and the resource is continually
located and exploited.
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